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We investigate the puzzle of choices of dominated personal pension instruments in 
Italy, with insurers’ products (PIPs) much more subscribed than shares of open pension funds 
offered by banks (FPAs). We find evidence, using the three waves of Bank of Italy’s Survey 
of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW) between 2010 and 2014, of a sales force effect 
deriving from a network of post offices and independent financial advisors associated with 
insurance companies much more widespread than bank branches. We document that financial 
literacy has a significant dampening effect on the supply push factor only for PIPs, and 
especially for the subset with voluntary matching employers’ contributions. The effect is 
detected mostly in the 2014 SHIW wave, the one fully affected by the implementation of the 
pension system reform legislated in December 2011.  
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Why choosing dominated personal pension plans: sales force and financial 





The Italian Pension Supervisory Authority (COVIP) documents a long standing choice 
of dominated financial products by Italian workers. Personal pension plans offered only by 
insurance companies (“new” Personal Investment Plans, PIPs) are much more widely 
subscribed than shares in open pension funds (FPAs), sold by insurers as well as by banks, in 
spite of an historical track of lower realized net returns and higher perspective costs.  
This paper is the first, to our knowledge, to probe into the determinants of subscriptions 
of PIPs and FPAs, and whether they changed owing to the consequences of the December 2011 
state pension system reform on the expected total pension income. To this end we use the three 
biennial waves of Bank of Italy’s Survey of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW) between 
2010 and 2014. The time span encompasses a macroeconomic scenario of recession and 
worsening labour market (a real GDP in 2014 more than 2% below the 2009 level and a loss 
of almost one million jobs), owing to the euro sovereign risk crisis that led, in order to correct 
a fundamental source of public debt unsustainability, to a major overhaul of the public pension 
system (Fornero reform), with only a minor change in the tax rate on financial returns of all 
pension funds. 
The main findings are three.  
First, we detect a strong heterogeneity in the statistical significance of estimates across 
the waves, a result that lends support to the hypothesis that the 2011 reform that raised 
retirement age and seniority requirements has reinforced the explanatory power of financial 
determinants in personal plan subscription choices.  
Second, we find that the most robust and statistically significant estimates refer to the 
proxies for supply side determinants, whereby the comparative advantage for subscriptions in 
PIPs rather than in FPAs is negatively and significantly correlated with the size of the city 
where employed household heads live. Our tentative interpretation points to a sales force effect, 
because of the reduced local availability of bank branches, which can offer both FPAs and 
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PIPs, compared with the independent financial advisors associated with insurance companies, 
who have reward incentives to push investors toward PIPs, as well as with the countrywide 
network of post offices, which sell only in-house PIPs. 
Third, we find that the indicator for the highest financial literacy level is statistically 
significant, with the expected dampening effect on the supply push toward PIPs, but only in 
the 2014 wave, the one affected by the full implementation of the pension reform legislated at 
the end of 2011, and especially when investigating the determinants of the subscription rate for 
the subset of PIPs with matching employers’ contributions. A similar outcome is obtained 
however also when using other indicators for lower levels of financial literacy (two instead of 
all correct answers to the “Big Three” questions). 
This paper contributes to several literatures.  
A first contribution is to the growing literature on consumers’ investment mistakes 
(starting from Campbell 2006; see also Hastings et al. 2013, 2017; Guiso and Sodini 2013; 
Iscenko 2018, and the references therein). Our investigation centres on the possible changes, 
because the 2011 pension system reform should have raised  workers’ financial awareness on 
the issue, in the explanatory power of the same set of determinants on the demand and supply 
sides in reduced form specifications for subscription rates of the two personal pension plans, 
one widely known to be dominated by the other. The pension reform event, widely known 
given the widespread media coverage and the political controversies that ensued1, calls for a 
research framework different from the experimental study by Finseraas and Jakobsson (2014) 
that detected effects on retirement plans when considering a different exposure to information 
on a 2011 pension reform in Norway between a treatment and a control group.  
A second contribution is to the literature concerning the role of supply factors in the 
choices of dominated instruments, focusing on an instance of the sales force effect, namely the 
local availability of point of sales for the two personal pension plans. Related recent papers are 
Gurun et al. (2016), for the case of expensive mortgages linked to the intensity of local 
advertising in the US, and Hastings et al. (2017), for the case of social security privatization in 
Mexico.  
A third contribution is to the literature on financial literacy concerning different 
measures of this elusive concept and, what is more, on the financial outcomes they can bring 
                                                          
1 In a survey referring to would-be retirees aged at least 55 years, less than one tenth of the respondents answer to 
have never heard of the reform, with over 40 per cent claiming to be aware of it and understanding its implications 




about, as well as on the policy implications on the cost effectiveness of education efforts aimed 
at increasing financial literacy (Lusardi and Mitchell 2014 and references therein; Hastings et 
al. 2013, 2017).   
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of 
the Italian pension system and spells out the two main research questions. Section 3 presents 
an explanatory analysis based on descriptive statistics on self-reported participation in private 
pension plans and on the association with financial literacy levels. Section 4 describes the 
empirical specifications and methodology that we use in the econometric investigation. Section 
5 presents the empirical findings results and their interpretation. Section 6 concludes and draws 
the main policy implications.   
2. An overview of the Italian pension system and research questions 
The Italian public pension system belongs to the notional defined contribution type, 
whereby the expected pension depends on the contributions accrued during the working period 
and on the notional rate of return tied to the GDP growth rate. The later the youth starts 
working, the more discontinued the work career, the lower the economy’s growth also because 
of the ageing, the more inadequate is the expected pension to guarantee a decent way of life in 
retirement. These features motivate the grim perspectives for the Italian youth, as enshrined in 
the governmental projections that take into account demographic trends and public finance 
sustainability issues. The Fornero reform accelerated toward a generalized notional 
contribution system, ending the slow phasing in of this system. Indeed, also workers with a 
career of at least eighteen years in 1995 who had been allowed to stay in the pre-existing 
defined benefit system, were now inserted for the remaining working career in the defined 
contribution regime. The curtailment of the expected accrued capital at retirement was bound 
to affect the choices for personal pension plans, with the aim to offset, at least partially, the 
ensuing loss.  
A three-pillar tax-incentived defined contribution private pension system supplements 
the public pension system. The first pillar consists of (non mandatory) occupational schemes 
(Fondi pensioni chiusi or FPNs) for dependent workers covered by collective agreements 
between trade unions and employers that determine also employers’ compulsory matching 
contributions. The second and the third pillars are two (voluntary) types of personal plans, for 
dependent workers as well as for self-employed and non-employed: a) Fondi pensione aperti 
(FPAs), created and managed by banks and insurance companies and open to both individual 
5 
 
and collective subscriptions; b)  since 2007, “new” Piani Individuali Pensionistici (from now 
on, PIPs), that is policies sold exclusively by insurance companies and that can be subscribed 
only individually, marketed also by banks, post offices and independent financial advisors2. 
Employers can voluntarily provide matching contributions for both FPAs and PIPs. Two other 
components, that are a legacy and, with some exceptions, closed to new membership, are “old” 
PIPs and pre-existing (i.e. existing before the 1992-95 overhaul of the pension system) firm-
based occupational pension funds. The focus of this paper is on the second and third pillar of 
the private pension system. However, SHIW data do not allow to identify old and new PIPs 
and provide data on all private pension funds with employers’ matching contributions that do 
not distinguish between FPNs and FPAs.  
FPAs offer different sub-funds, ranging from low-risk investment style to a riskier one 
(i.e. all-share). PIPs’ subscribers, can choose traditional life insurance products (Ramo I), 
invested almost entirely in (domestic) public bonds, or a portfolio of unit-linked investment 
plans, with different risk profiles, managed by the same company or by another one (Ramo 
III); a combination of both choices is also available3. A noticeable difference, on transparency 
ground for potential subscribers, is that FPAs and unit-linked based PIPs adopt a market price 
valuation and there is no guarantee on the sum of nominal contributions, gross of the 
management costs; PIPs that replicate traditional life insurance products are instead valued at 
historical cost and provide a guarantee on the cumulated contributions.   
Table 1 reports the subscriptions to the private pension system starting from 2007, when 
PIPs were introduced following a law passed in 2005. A remarkable fact is the increase of PIPs 
between 2007 and 2017, almost twice the combined increase of the subscriptions to FPNs and 
FPAs, about 800,000 and 600,000 respectively4. The finding is not materially affected by the 
possible overestimation in PIPs data, since the COVIP statistics until 2015 were unable to 
properly handle multiple memberships (i.e. a person could subscribe to several personal plans).  
TABLE 1 APPROXIMATELY HERE 
                                                          
2 PIPs differ from life insurance products mainly because of age pension eligibility requirements.    
3 Subscriptions and contributions in traditional life insurance policies amount to more than 70 per cent of total 
PIPs (COVIP 2015).   
4 The data are gross of the subscriptions with missing contributions, at all or during the year. The proportion is 
sizable and increasing during the five years considered: overall, almost one fourth, rising to over 30 per cent for 
PIPs and even more for FPAs, hitting mostly self-employed who can rely exclusively on own contributions 
(COVIP 2011, 2013, 2015).    
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In fact, according to the new COVIP information system, implemented provisionally 
since 2015 and fully operative since 2016, the effective membership of the private pension 
system at end-2015 – the year closer to the last SHIW wave used in this paper – amounted to 
6,716 million (included 434,000 in old PIPs), with a reduction of almost 8% relative to the 
grand total of 7,235 million. The subscribers to only one sub-fund among FPNs, FPAs and PIPs 
were 5,744 million. The remaining 1,108 “subscriptions” referred to 538,000 individuals, 
mostly with double membership (only 6,000 individuals had triple or quadruple membership). 
Almost two thirds involved PIPs: they were taken by 172,000 enrollees in FPNs, 78,000 in 
FPAs, 90,000 in other PIPs (COVIP 2017). 
Individual subscriptions of self-employed and not employed, negligible in FPNs, 
accounted for almost a half in FPAs at end-2016 (COVIP 2017). The share of collective 
subscriptions to FPAs in 2015 was instead equal to 18%; only 20% of the investment in PIPs 
were funded through the accruals to TFR (capitalized deferred wage)5 and optional private 
employers’ contributions (COVIP 2016).  
The “revealed” preferences between PIPs and FPAs are a “financial mistake” 
(Campbell 2006), given two widely known fundamentals. First, PIPs’ averaged net returns 
since 2008 are consistently lower than FPAs’ ones (Tables 2 and A.1). Second, the Synthetic 
Cost Indicator (SCI), as a percent of the accrued capital, that takes into account the expected 
averaged main recurring costs for subscribers (initial membership, annual administration and 
management fees, transfer of the individual position across sub-funds) over different 
investment periods, as estimated by COVIP (hence, public knowledge), is consistently higher 
for PIPs (Table 3).  
These stylized facts raise two research questions.  
First research question. Do supply factors overhaul the demand factors, which would 
suggest to choose FPAs instead of PIPs, given the lower prospective costs and the higher 
realized net rate of returns even for all unit-linked based PIPs? A likely suspect are higher 
monetary incentives earned by financial advisers when nudging investors towards a 
subscription to a PIP rather than a FPA. Anecdotal evidence supports the claim that the 
mechanism is at work within banking groups having commercial agreements with independent 
                                                          
5 The annual return rate is determined by law as to 1.5 per cent plus ¾ of the inflation rate. A private sector 
employee who decides not to subscribe to the eligible occupational pension scheme and to invest instead the TFR 
accruals into a PIP or a FPA gives up the right to get the compulsory matching employer’s contribution; the 
employer can however voluntarily agree for matching contributions.  
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or in house insurance companies. The pension supervisory authority itself consistently hints 
that the huge increase in PIPs membership in comparison with the alternative choice could be 
explained by aggressive selling policies of financial advisers, because the variable component 
of their compensation is linked to the fee-generating PIPs subscriptions (COVIP 2011 55; 2015, 
23; 2016, 43).  
Owing to the lack of hard data on these candidate supply push factors we try to detect 
their effects with a proxy – the size of the city where HHS live – as an indicator of  the 
comparatively different availability of points of contacts – for advisory and subscriptions.  A 
possible motivation for dominated choices could in fact be that from investors are nudged 
towards PIPs by the financial agents they are acquainted with in local markets.  
 
In the 2007-2014 period, the industry of private pension funds, except for PIPs, has 
undergone an, indeed overdue, process of concentration, in order to exploit economies of scale 
for assets under management. FPNs and FPAs have shrunk by 4 and 2, respectively; PIPs have 
instead increased by 66. The likely effects of these divergent trends are greater economies of 
scope, that can enhance the marketing potential, though with a widening of the already 
significant cost differential for PIPs7. 
  
PIPs can be marketed in any financial outlet (bank branches, post offices, independent 
financial advisers); insurers are also licensed to sell FPAs. At end-2017, out of 35 insurance 
companies offering PIPs, 21 were selling also FPAs. Bank branches, which advertise also 
personal pension plans, are however less widespread in smaller cities compared to independent 
financial promoters of insurance products and, above all, post offices. As of 2017, in fact, the 
market leader for PIPs is Poste Vita Group, a subsidiary of the state-controlled Poste Italiane 
group, with a stock of 943,000 PIPs (more than three times the 2010 figure) and a market share 
of one third. Poste Italiane’s 13,000 post offices are present in almost any Italian city (owing 
to the universal postal service mandate)8, and unlike bank branches are open also Saturday 
                                                          
6 At end-2017, FPNs have fallen by 3, to 35; FPAs by 7, to 43; PIPs by 1 to 77 (of which 35 are closed to new 
subscriptions); COVIP (2018). 
7 Indeed, Italy is the country with the highest spread in recurrent costs (i.e. management fee of the asset manager) 
among distributors for each product by EU states for products with capital guarantee (life insurance and pension 
products) and ranks third and fifth, respectively, for the spreads in capital pension guaranteed and mutual funds 
pension products (EC 2018, Table 6). Italy is also the country with the largest spread for one-off fees in life 
insurance products without capital guarantee (EC 2018, Table 7).  
8 As a way of comparison, the two largest banking groups, Intesa and Unicredit, have respectively about 4,600 
and 3,100 branches. 
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morning. Subscribers of PIPs sold by Poste Vita have their pensions credited in their postal 
deposits (Poste Italiane 2018). Worthy of note is another ex ante comparative advantage for 
Poste Italiane when contacting a potential subscriber. Postal deposits are guaranteed in full by 
the state, whereas bank deposits are insured up to 100,000 euro per depositor per bank by the 
banks’ national deposit insurance scheme. Furthermore, the state control of the Poste Italiane 
could raise expectations, on moral hazard grounds, that the traditional life insurance policies 
subset of PIPs sold by the controlled Poste Vita are less risky in comparison with other 
insurance companies. These facts can help to rationalize why, in a survey on the perceptions 
and information on the 2011 pension reform among would-be retirees aged 55 years and over,  
banks are considered more trustworthy as a source of financial advice by a factor of more than 
two and four, respectively, compared with independent financial advisers and insurance 
(Fornero et al. 2018). On the one hand, these evaluations can be ineffective in terms of 
outcomes because of the constraint of geographical market structure heterogeneity. On the 
other hand, the survey does not consider explicitly the state controlled Poste Italiane.  
The geographical market structure for FPAs and PIPs reminds of a recent study on the 
Mexican private account Social Security system that documents that many participants invest 
their account balances with dominated financial providers, which charge high fees not offset 
by higher returns but invest heavily in sales force and advertising, non-price attributes that 
substitute for competition on price (Hastings et al. 2017).  
 
TABLES 2-3 APPROXIMATELY HERE 
Second research question. Do financially literate potential subscribers choose more 
carefully looking through sellers’ advices? As OECD (2016, 132) puts it, “Members of DC 
plans […] should be aware that they are directly charged a fee for administration and asset 
management services. These costs can have a material negative impact on future retirement 
income. Individuals should keep costs into account when estimating their retirement income 
needs but complicated fee structures may make comparisons across different plans difficult”.  
A higher level of financial literacy should help raise the awareness about the supply 
push factors towards PIPs rather than FPAs, the more so when the Fornero reform is likely to 
have enhanced the attractiveness of private pensions. Potential subscribers should have been 
able – the better so if financially literate – to focus their minds on how to offset the perspective 
reduction in the substitution rate of the public pension system, against a backdrop of a more 
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acute perception of public debt sustainability risks. After all, this was the main driver of the 
reform, aimed at restoring markets’ confidence in the public debt of the third largest Eurozone 
country.  
We answer the research questions relying mostly on the three waves, from 2010 to 
2014, of the Bank of Italy’s biennial survey on household income and wealth (SHIW), that 
include an identical questionnaire on private pension choices. The time span fits the research 
agenda because, against the backdrop of macroeconomic recession context, it allows to 
investigate on the possible, though delayed, effects of one major, unexpected but widely known 
once legislated, innovation in the pension system, whereas the only change for the private 
pension system was a minor rise in the substitute tax rate on financial returns9. Only the 2010 
SHIW wave, that includes a special module, can instead be used to compute indicators on 
financial literacy levels.  
 
3. Personal pension choices and financial literacy in the 2010 SHIW: an 
exploratory analysis 
The Section is organized as follows: a) an overview of SHIW; b) descriptive statistics 
on self-reported participation in private pension plans, in order to assess how representative is 
the survey; c) an exploratory analysis on the association between financial literacy levels 
computed for the 2010 wave and subscription rates in private pension plans. 
 
a) Overview of SHIW. 
Bank of Italy’s SHIW is a biennial survey on income and wealth with about 8,000 
household heads (HHs), i.e. the component who takes the main decisions on household’s 
finances. Each survey, besides a fixed template, has modules that may or may not be replicated 
in the next wave. In our case, only the three waves from 2010 to 2014 have a  module on the 
subscription to private pension, with identical wording (see Appendix). A module on financial 
literacy is present instead only in the 2010 SHIW, and this is the reason why, being interested 
in investigating the links between subscription rates in pension plans and financial literacy, we 
build a balanced panel (BP) of 2320 HHs 25 to 65 years old.  
                                                          
9 The substitute tax rate was further raised retrospectively from 11.5 to 20% beginning first January 2014, in the 
Financial Law for 2015, approved at end 2014. The survey data for the 2014 SHIW wave, collected during the 
year, before the unexpected innovation, should not therefore be affected.  
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 Wealthier HHs, who are likely to be more interested into – and financially capable of 
– subscribing personal pension plans10, are also the ones more affected by under- and mis-
reporting on (net of taxes) income and current value of wealth, real and financial (including 
pension funds and life insurance), as exhaustively documented by Baffigi et al. (2016, Section 
4). In this paper we deal with these data issues as follows. First, we adjust household income11 
for the number of its components, using the OECD equivalence weights; second, we split the 
resulting equivalent income and financial assets by deciles12; third, as an indicator of housing 
wealth we use a binary variable ownership/no ownership of the main home13; fourth, we take 
into account debt with a binary variable on whether a HH is a mortgagee or not. The drawback 
of these choices, with all explanatory variables in binary or categorical format, except for age, 
is to shrink the variation in micro data, already low over a time span of five years, and to have 
high correlation among the indicators of equivalent income and financial assets. With respect 
to this last issue, to reduce collinearity, we drop financial assets as an explanatory variable.  
 
b) Private pension plans participation. 
 
The averaged subscription rates computed out of HHs’ answers of the three waves for 
the balanced panel, adjusted for sample weights, reveal sizable differences within the SHIW 
data and compared with COVIP data as well (Table 4).  
TABLE 4 APPROXIMATELY HERE 
The most puzzling finding is the very low subscription rate to FPNs, given the grand 
total of subscription rate to any private pension plan, included also old PIPs and pre-existing 
occupational pension funds14. The combined averaged subscription rates to all pension plans 
in each wave (24.8, 26.5 and 23.6 per cent) is roughly similar to the grand total only if the 
“real” FPNs subscribers are the ones acknowledging employers’ matching contributions, an 
assumption that disregards that they include also the voluntary contributions for FPAs and 
                                                          
10 One of the fiscal incentives is the income tax break up to 5,165 euros.   
11 Nominal income is not adjusted given the low inflation rates experienced in the period 2010-14.  
12 A different choice was adopted in a study on the demand of life insurance by Italian households, financial 
inclusion, and financial literacy, where income and wealth are entered as log of current values drawn from the 
2004-2012 SHIW panel dataset (Luciano et al. 2016).    
13 Though even the number of dwellings – main residence and not – is sizably under-reported, the measurement 
issue should be plausibly less relevant when considering the main home (Baffigi et al. 2016, 81-83). 
14 SHIW data do not allow to take into account how many subscribers have not paid contributions, in the year or 
at all. According to COVIP data, these subscribers amount to at least one fifth, and are more concentrated on 
personal pension plans, and especially among self-employed, with a proportion of almost one third (for data up to 
2014 see COVIP 2015).  
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PIPs.  The underestimation of average participation rates in surveys may be due to several 
reasons, including respondents’ tendency to mis-report financial decisions (Gustman et al. 
2008). In the case of Italy, Cappelletti and Guazzarotti (2010) documented a significantly lower 
participation rate in the private pension system in the 2008 SHIW, compared to COVIP data, 
possibly because of under-reporting and low sampling of workers in sectors with above-
average participation rates, such as at large firms.  
A second puzzle in the data is the rather erratic dynamics of SHIW statistics on 
participation rates, across waves, when compared with the steady upward trend in the COVIP 
data in Table 1, mostly determined by the increase in PIPs.  
These descriptive statistics suggest therefore caution in drawing policy implications 
from the results of the empirical investigation based on individual data, unadjusted for sample 
weights, though SHIW it is the best database available.  
 
c) Financial literacy and personal pension plans subscriptions. 
Financial literacy needs vary in relation to different types of retirement saving. As 
underlined in OECD (2016, 128), decision-making about retirement is likely to be more 
difficult and require better financial literacy when making choices on personal pension plans. 
Indeed, a more diversified portfolio of investment alternatives requires greater financial skills 
when compared to the occupational plans, which have a narrower range of options as for the 
choices of the provider and of the plan. Moreover, lower amounts of assets under management 
in personal occupational plans imply that, for a given target of the accrued capital at retirement, 
subscribers have to contribute more on their own, in order to offset higher costs from reduced 
economies of scale and/or to accept riskier investment profiles. 
The questions that operationalize the enquiries on the financial literacy that have come 
to be known as the “Big Three” – interest compounding, inflation and real interest rate, risk 
diversification – (e.g. Lusardi and Mitchell 2011a, Klapper et al. 2016) are unlikely to fit the 
required competencies for retirement investment choices, as stressed by the OECD. In addition, 
it is an open issue how to map into a meaningful ranking score the number of correct answers 
to fairly different questions (Hung et al. 2009), thus making it hard to detect financial literacy 
effects on pension choices. Finally, a necessary condition for financial literacy to turn into 
financial capability to implement “optimal” investment choices is that the potential subscriber 
earns enough to save.  
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Against this backdrop we exploit the 2010 SHIW, that has a module with three 
questions on financial literacy, for an exploratory analysis of the characteristics of subscribers 
to private pension plans. Though the main focus is on personal plans, we consider also the 
choice to subscribe to any type of private pension plans, because being not mandatory they 
imply an active choice.  
The first question on financial literacy combines concepts of mortgages with fixed and 
variable interest rate, and of variable or constant mortgage instalments; a second question is 
centred on nominal interest rate and inflation; a third one is on risk diversification (see 
Appendix  for the exact wording). As it is common in international comparisons on financial 
literacy (Lusardi and Mitchell 2014), around one third of HHs answers correctly to all three 
questions; the risk diversification issue is the least understood.  
As expected, the distribution of correct answers among subscribers of private pension 
plans is tilted towards a higher score, but there is no strong association with the different levels 
of financial literacy: the statistics on the association with a correct answer on risk 
diversification are similar to the ones referring to at least two correct answers (Table 5).  
TABLES 5-6 APPROXIMATELY HERE 
Unsurprisingly, financial literacy should show up also when investigating its 
association with an indicator of participation in the market of risky financial instruments, 
namely ownership of shares and mutual funds, notwithstanding the well-known under-
reporting issue. Again, a correct answer on the question on risk diversification shows up as 
equivalent to other indicators for at least two correct answers (Table 6). The association 
between holding risky assets and subscription rates to private pension plans confirms 
qualitatively the findings of Table 5.  
Finally, in order to take into account that financial constrains could inhibit the 
financially literate from implementing proper investment choices, we exploit a question, 
present in all three waves, on whether the HH has been able to save in the reference year15. As 
expected, positive savings are associated with higher financial literacy levels (Table 7) and 
higher subscription rates in pension plans as well (Table 8).  
 
                                                          
15 We prefer this subjective information to the alternative of computing saving as income minus consumption 
expenditure, because the under- and mis-reporting in their nominal values, which affect especially the second 
variable, yields overestimated savings (Baffigi et al. 2016).  
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TABLES 7-8 APPROXIMATELY HERE 
 
4. The econometric investigation framework  
 
The econometric investigation has to cope with the reduced variation and change, if 
ever, of the categorical variables owing to the short time span. We rely therefore on single 
wave cross-sections estimates and, when probing into financial literacy, on reduced samples 
drawn from a balanced panel, because a questionnaire is available only for the 2010 wave.  
The baseline reduced form specification of the cross-section equations with controls for 
the usual demographic characteristics focuses on assessing, first, the explanatory role on the 
subscription rate in five types of personal pension plans of 25-65 years old employed HHs of 
financial explanatory variables on the demand side as well as of suppliers’ local availability 
indicators. Worthy of note is that the much higher proportion of PIP subscriptions over all 
private pension plans (PENS) in the SHIW individual data (around 47%), compared to the 
reference universe (about one third in the 2015 COVIP revised data, net of multiple 
subscriptions), should result in similar estimated coefficients in the respective equations, 
though with magnified effects when referring to PIPs rather than to PENS.  
The baseline specification for the i-th HH is:  
 
Si = Di + YWi + FSi + GSi  
 
where: 
S = binary variable for a HH being subscribed to any private pension plan (PENS), PIPs 
as a whole and the subsets with and without matching voluntary employers’ contributions 
(PIPCs and PIPNCs), open pension plan (FPAs) 16;  
D = binary variables for demographic characteristics (female, upper secondary degree, 
university degree, single, widow(er), private employee, public employee, small firm with 5-49 
workers, medium firm with 50-99 workers, big firm with 100 workers and over, resident in the 
North, resident in the Centre), except for the continuous variables age and age squared;  
                                                          
16 In principle, there could be a potential sample selection issue, because only a subscriber to any private pension 
plan could also be a PIP or a FPA subscriber. As remarked, however, the data do not allow to recover the gran 




YW = binary variables for second to tenth equivalent income deciles income, home 
ownership and mortgagee status; 
FS = financial strength binary variables (positive saving, risky asset ownership); 
GS = binary variables proxying suppliers’ local availability (medium city, with 20,000 
to 40,000 inhabitants; large city, with 40,000 to 500,000; big city, with 500,000 and over). 
The reference characteristics of the omitted HH are male, up to lower secondary degree, 
married, self-employed, micro firm with 1-4 workers, resident in the South and Inlands, first 
decile of equivalent income, no home owner, no mortgage, no saving, no risky asset owner, 
small city with less than 20,000 inhabitants. 
The expected signs for most demographic characteristics and income and home 
ownership are the ones usually found in the literature. The sign for the status of mortgagee is 
instead uncertain, because being already a bank customer could ease, from both demand and 
supply sides, the access to another bank product, namely an FPA. The financial strength 
variables we are more interested in, also because of direct and reverse linkages with financial 
literacy, are expected to be positively signed.  
As for the proxies on local suppliers’ availability, the city size categorical variables 
should be associated with different signs and statistical significance between PIPs (negative 
and significant) and FPAs (uncertain sign and not significant). The effects could be further 
enhanced in the case of PIPCs, because the voluntary employer’s contribution could make them 
more attractive for sellers, compared with PIPNCs.  
In order to take into account the pension system environments before (2010), at the 
inception of (2012), and after (2014) the full implementation of the Fornero reform, we are 
interested in comparing estimates across waves. We expect that the role of the indicators of 
financial strength should increase between 2012 and 2014 as (wealthier) HHs react to the 
reform.  
 Against the backdrop of five baseline estimation results for the cross section in each 
SHIW wave, we investigate subsequently whether different levels of financial literacy have an 
own statistically significant effect. We add to the baseline specification above as a regressor a 
binary indicator equal to 1 when all three answers are correct, 0 otherwise. Financially literate 
investors should be more careful in acting on sellers’ claims, and therefore the expected sign 
is negative. We explore also whether there is evidence of significant differences when 
considering various levels of financial literacy as well as interactions between financial literacy 
levels and suppliers’ local availability, because smaller cities could in principle be a social 




Owing to data availability, the estimates refer to the cross sections extracted from the 
balanced panel, under the assumption that the level of financial literacy in the 2010 SHIW of 
each HH 25-65 years old surviving in the successive waves remains the same.  
Two remarks on the estimation samples are worthy of note.  
First, by construction, the samples are modified across waves because HHs aged 65+ 
exit but there are no entries of younger ones. The changing composition effect therefore leads 
to increasing average age and consequently, as suggested by a life-cycle framework, to higher 
average income and wealth. The averages, across waves, for the reduced samples, compared 
with the ones for the full samples, do bear out the easily foreseeable outcomes for the 
percentage composition: lower and stable status of single, slow increase in university degree, 
increasing concentration in the tenth income decile (computed including also pensioners and 
other not employed people), higher and increasing home ownership (Tables A.2-3). The 
dynamics is quite different in the two datasets also for other less obviously trends: reduced 
incidence of residence in the Northern region, decreasing share of public employment, not 
completely offset by the trend in private employment, falling share of self-reported savers, 
opposite trends for mortgagees.  
Second, because of the no entries in the reduced sample, also the subscription rates to 
any private pension plan show almost no dynamics. This is in contrast with the declining trend 
in the full sample, except for FPAs, a trend that, as already remarked, does not match the 
aggregate COVIP data, most especially for PIPs.  
We run both linear probability models (LPM) and probit models. Being the results 
almost identical for size, sign and statistical significance of the regressors, we report only the 
LPM estimates, more robust to collinearity deriving from the low variation in micro data, and 
the average marginal effects computed out of the probit estimates for the explanatory variables 
we are more interested in (gender, financial strength, suppliers’ local availability).  
 
 
5. Empirical findings and discussion 
 
Full sample cross sections 
 
PENS. The main results of the LPM estimates broadly confirm the expected effects for 




TABLE 9 APPROXIMATELY HERE 
 
i. Income and housing wealth variables have the expected sign and statistical 
significance in each cross section, with some intriguing variability across waves. The positive 
and significant differential effect of higher income deciles, as made possible by the saving 
capability and by the ability to exploit the incentive of the fiscal deductibility of own 
contributions, shrinks:  it is detected starting from the seventh decile in the 2014 wave instead 
of the fifth one in 2010 and 2012, with an overall loss of significance. Home ownership is 
(weakly) significant only in 2014. On the contrary, even demographic characteristics, such as 
being single, being a widow(er) and living in the Northern become insignificant in the 2014 
wave. A special case of demographic characteristics is the different size of firms, with a 
positive higher differential effect the larger the firm. The categorical variables could proxy the 
trade unions role as sponsors of occupational plans (especially for PENS), as well as capture 
the “efficiency wage” effect of larger firms willing to offer comprehensive compensation 
packages that include voluntary employers’ contributions to personal plans (especially for 
FPAs and PIPCs).  
ii. Financial strength indicators are always jointly statistically significant. The 
saving coefficient has the expected positive sign and, compared with 2010 and especially with 
2012, increases in absolute value and significance in 2014.  
iii. Sellers’ local availability variables are always negative and highly significant, 
except for the 2012 wave. An interesting difference with respect to the 2010 wave is the pattern 
of increasing absolute value in the 2014 wave for the coefficients of two upper city size 
categories. 
iv. Overall, the estimates for the 2014 wave following the full implementation of 
the Fornero reform support the claim that expected reactions in the pension choices towards 
private pension plans are detectable, especially for financially stronger households; the 
variability in the reactions across most other demographic and income characteristics compared 
with the reference ones is instead reduced. 
PIPs. The findings on PENS show up more sharply in the case of PIPs, that as 
previously remarked account for about a half of all pension plans on unadjusted data for sample 
weights.  
Compared with the 2012 wave, the 2014 one yields even more clearly that the 
subscription rate is mainly associated with indicators of financial strength, as well as of home 
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ownership, whereas income variables differential effects almost disappear (Table 10). When 
compared with the case of PENS, the estimated coefficients for the sellers’ local availability 
indicators, always negatively signed, are more statistically significant (even in 2012) and larger 
in absolute values, especially for the two upper city size categories.  
 
TABLES 10 -12 APPROXIMATELY HERE 
 
PIPCs, PIPNCs. When considering PIPs with and without voluntary employees’ 
contributions, what explains most the differences between the 2012 and 2014 waves is that 
subscribing PIPCs turns out to be strongly associated with sellers’ local availability; as for the 
indicators of financial strength, saving is strongly significant only for PIPCs whereas 
ownership of risky asset only for PIPNCs (Table 11). The changing role of financial strength 
and sellers’ local availability across waves is revealed also by the two joint exclusion tests: the 
null for the city size categories is not rejected in the 2010 wave for PIPNCs and in the 2012 
wave for PIPCs; both nulls are strongly rejected in the 2014 wave. 
FPAs. As expected, most coefficient estimates for sellers’ local availability proxies are 
statistically insignificant; the exception, at a 10% level of confidence, is the coefficient for the 
big city categorical variable in the 2012 wave (Table 12). It is worthy of note that only for 
FPAs, in the 2014 wave, the state of being a mortgagee is (weakly) significant and positively 
signed, a finding that hints at an enhancing effect of being already a bank customer for the 
subscription of products, FPAs, offered also by banks.  
To sum up, the average marginal effects, computed using the probit estimates of the 
baseline specifications for 45 years old HHs (a typical worker’s prime age peak) provide a 
synopsis of the change in probability when each dummy variable for the financial strength and 
supply indicators takes a value of one, instead of zero (Table 13. The overall picture is of a 
2014 wave that, in comparison with the 2012 one, has a larger set of highly significant average 
marginal effects, positively signed for the financial strength variables and negatively for the 
suppliers’ local availability indicators, except for FPAs.    
TABLE 13 APPROXIMATELY HERE 
  
Financial literacy in cross sections out of the balanced panel 
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Are the results, especially for suppliers’ local availability indicators, robust to the 
introduction of controls for financial literacy levels? We probe the issue adding to the baseline 
specifications a binary indicator (finlit_3) equal to one for HHs who in the 2010 SHIW 
answered correctly to all three questions, and zero otherwise. The same indicator is imputed to 
the surviving (i.e. not exiting, because of age or becoming not employed) households in the 
2012 and 2014 waves of the balanced panel.  
i. Given the different composition of the reduced samples, compared with the full ones, 
it is not surprising the loss of significance for many explanatory variables, especially the 
income deciles as well as the (joint) financial strength variables. It is therefore even more 
interesting to underline the robustness of the estimates for sellers’ local availability indicators 
(Tables 14-17).  
One motivation for the less relevant role of financial strength variables is that finlit_3 
is in general weakly significant and/or could be highly collinear in particular with the risky 
asset ownership (see Table 5). An interesting result is that the finlit_3 coefficient, never 
significant in the 2010, is significant in the PIPCs regression in 2012 and in the PIPs and 
PIPNCs ones in 2014, and negatively signed. Our interpretation is that these findings lend 
support to the claim that financially literate investors, acquainted with the effects of the Fornero 
reform, react with a progressively more careful choice of personal plans, thus reducing the 
nudging effects of PIPs suppliers. Indeed, when we enter the financial literacy indicator 
interacted with the city size indicators, we get significant estimates even where finlit_3 alone 
was not (PENS in 2012 and 2014, PIPs in 2012, PIPCs in 2010 and 2014).  
The average marginal effects of finlit_3, also interacted with city size indicators, are 
overall similar to the ones obtained for the full sample. A remarkable difference is the negative 
marginal effect in the PIPCs case, which is also increasingly larger in absolute value and 
statistical significance across waves (Table 18).  
TABLES 14-17 APPROXIMATELY HERE 
 
ii. These results raise some doubts on a strategy aimed at a higher rather than simply a 
basic financial literacy. Some hints can be inferred comparing the statistically significant 
average marginal effects obtained replacing finlit_3 with seven alternative indicators, 
computed according to whether the correct answers to the three questions on the 2010 SHIW 
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range from one to at least two17 (for descriptive statistics see Table A.3). Year, sign and 
significance of the new estimates are pretty similar to the ones obtained with finlit_3, though 
with some interesting differences (Table 19). Concerning PIPs, the marginal effect is identical 
in 2014 for the indicator for risk diversification and mortgage. As for the subset PIPCs, that 
increased in the reduced sample by six percentage points as a proportion of PIPs between 2012 
and 2014 (Table A.3), the marginal effects in 2014 are however pretty similar for all indicators 
except two (one answer for interest rate & inflation and at least two answers; for previous 
waves, different indicators have the same marginal effects of finlit_3. In the case of PIPNCs, 
instead, marginal effects are significant for the indicators that do not affect PIPCs, and are 
always positively signed. Finally, marginal effects for FPAs are never significant in 2014.  
The finding that correct answers to the risk diversification and to the mortgage 
questions, alone or when entered in two-answers indicators have marginal effects for PIPCs in  
2014 similar to finlit_3, fits the literature according to which, though risk diversification is the 
least understood concept in financial literacy (Klapper et al. 2016), it is the one that matters 
most in retirement planning and precautionary savings (Lusardi and Michell 2011b; on US 
data, Lusardi 2015). A correct answer on mortgage hints at the positive role of a direct or 
indirect familiarity with this banking product in helping potential investors to better assess 
advisory services also on other financial products.   
The evidence we provide on the role of which financial literacy indicator matter in 
pension choices sets the Italian case in recent years on a par with other countries. Previous 
studies on the overall participation rate in the private pension system had found instead 
significant effects for different indicators of financial literacy. The correct answer on the effect 
of inflation on the purchasing power is significant at the 10% level in the 2008 SHIW 
(Cappelletti and Guazzarotti 2010, table 4); the correct answer on interest rate, that has also the 
lowest proportion of correct answers, is significant at the 1% level in the 2006 SHIW (Fornero 
and Monticone 2011). 
The debate on financial literacy and financial advice is mostly concerned with the issue 
on whether they are substitute or complement, considering the investment choices from the 
demand side perspective (Calcagno and Monticone 2015). The somehow sobering result of this 
paper on the limited role of financial literacy echoes a similar outcome in the investigation of 
the role of financial literacy in standard financial choices with a well defined dominated choice 
                                                          
17 We report LPM estimates (bold italics) for non interacted financial indicators whenever the probit routine does 
not converge.  
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(timing in trading, investment in own banks’ bonds, CAPM suggested portfolio allocation) 
using data from a survey conducted by an Italian bank on a sample of clients with at least 
10,000 euros in financial wealth (Guiso and Viviano 2015).  
We surmise that the main contribution of this paper is to show how potential market 
structure features, though crudely proxied with the indicators of four city size classes, 
according to where HHs reside, help to better reframe the debate on dominated choices in the 
Italian experience with regards to the role of demand side explanatory variables (income, 
housing wealth and financial strength) as well as of financial literacy. Indeed, we detect a robust 
sales force effect (Hastings et al. 2017) across all SHIW waves and find that financial literacy 
shields to some extent investors from sellers’ push factors, at least for some personal pension 
plans. In addition, these effect are detected especially after HHs have had time to assess the 
implications of an important pension system reform.    
 
 TABLES 18-19 APPROXIMATELY HERE 
 
iii. From a methodological standpoint, it is in the end an impossible mission to disentangle 
the direct and reverse mutual causality feedbacks in a set of variables comprising financial 
education as well as personal experience in financial decisions that contribute to the acquisition 
of financial literacy (however measured), and the further layers of mutual links with saving, 
investment choices, level and composition of wealth.  
One often proposed solution, namely searching for an exogenous variation in properly 
measured financial literacy, is hard to implement owing to data availability in surveys such as 
the SHIW. Within the literature of microeconometric methods applied to surveys or large 
administrative data set, the ingenuity in picking variables from a wide range of possible choices 
to instrument financial literacy indicators rarely provides unquestionably convincing evidence 
on causality. When attempted, a common result is that instrumental variables (IV) estimates of 
the effects of financial literacy are larger than the OLS estimates (Lusardi and Mitchell 2014). 
However, these results are to be assessed against the backdrop of well known sources of 
contrasting biases in the estimates of the expected positive correlation between financial 
literacy and financial outcomes, such as subscription rates in pension plans: upwards, owing to 
reverse causality (e.g. endogeneity by learning-by-doing effects on financial literacy of 
experience of saving or ownership of risky assets or bank relations) and unobserved 
heterogeneity (e.g. patience or forward-looking behaviour, personality, family background); 
downwards, because of measurement errors in computing indicators of financial literacy. 
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Also the evidence on whether financial education causally improves financial 
outcomes, provided by studies relying on small-scale field experiments or large-scale natural 
experiments, is at best inconclusive (Hastings et al., 2012).  
All in all, though in principle affected by upward and downward biases, the LPM results 
we commented upon provide therefore a lower bound for the financial literacy effects for an 
outcome such as personal pension choices (Lusardi and Mitchell 2014; Guiso and Viviano 
2015). We surmise that the baseline specifications, with controls for a set of financial variables 
with positive bivariate correlations with financial literacy indicators – saving, risky instruments 
ownership, mortgagee status – should on the one hand reduce the upward bias. The use of 
different indicators of financial literacy should on the other hand deflate to some extent the 
downward bias due to measurement errors. The overall findings should therefore provide 
sufficiently convincing evidence on the positive, as expected, small but statistically significant, 




6. Conclusions and policy implications  
 
 
This paper investigates the puzzle of choices of dominated personal pension 
instruments in Italy (insurers’ PIPs, instead of shares of insurers and banks’ open funds FPAs) 
by household heads whose awareness on returns in private pension plans should have been 
raised by the higher retirement age and seniority requirements of the Fornero pension system 
reform legislated in December 2011. The empirical investigation exploited the availability of 
three waves of the biennial Bank of Italy’s survey on households’ income and wealth (SHIW) 
between 2010 and 2014.  
Regarding the first research question on the possible role of sales force effects 
countervailing demand side determinants, we provide evidence of  heterogeneity of demand 
side explanatory variables across SHIW waves, lending support to the hypothesis that the 
pension reform has affected households’ choices for personal pensions. The financial strength 
indicators are indeed more statistically significant and economically relevant in the 2014 wave 
compared to the previous ones. Furthermore, subscription rates to PIPs are negatively and 
significantly correlated with the size of the cities where employed HHs live. Our tentative 
interpretation is that this finding supports the hypothesis of a market structure effect on the 
supply side, because of a reduced local availability of bank branches, that can sell both FPAs 
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and PIPs, compared with the countrywide network of post offices (owing to the universal postal 
service mandate of the state controlled Poste Italiane) and independent financial advisers 
associated with insurance companies – among which the one controlled by Poste Italiane.  We 
are unable to proxy, owing to the data availability in SHIW, the further supply side effect 
associated to the reward incentives for financial advisers, included bank employees, tilted 
toward subscriptions in PIPs rather than in FPAs.  
Regarding the second research question on whether financial literacy helps to shield 
investors from the persuasion effects of sales force and marketing investment, we provide 
evidence of a statistically significant dampening effect on the supply push toward PIPs, but 
only in the 2014 wave, the one fully affected by the implementation of the pension reform 
legislated at the end of 2011. This effect is even stronger for the subset of PIPs with voluntary 
matching employers’ contributions (PIPCs). These findings, obtained when using the indicator 
of top financial literacy (correct answers to all three questions in the 2010 SHIW wave module), 
are however similar to the ones obtained with other indicators with one or two correct answers. 
The policy implications we draw from our investigation are three. 
First, financial literacy is the result of financial education as well as of personal 
experience in financial matters. The event of a pension system reform, widely believed to have 
been the main lever for shifting the Italian public debt sustainability markets’ expectations from 
a bad to a good equilibrium, should have acted as a catalyst for employed household heads to 
reassess their private pension choices. The results provide indeed evidence for such a change 
between 2012 and 2014, namely the expected higher attractiveness for personal pension plan 
subscriptions, though with a market structure pushing towards dominated choices.  
Second, public policies aimed at improving consumer financial outcomes, whatever the 
level of financial literacy, have to encompass a wide variety of regulatory approaches, to avoid 
excessive pressure by suppliers in concentrated local markets. Structural regulation is called 
for, in order to let workers to have a wide enough choice of local different financial outlets. 
Independent Fintech advisers and providers could play a role with online outlets supplementing 
the physical ones in local markets. In addition, besides designing more effective guidelines and 
supervision on how consultants inform and advise workers in their pension choices, it is crucial 
to restrain incentives and conflicts of interest that bias towards home-made products, following 
the best practices of the bans on inducement towards in-house products in the Netherlands and 
the UK (European Commission 2018).  
Third, the finding that a higher financial literacy is not an unquestionable plus raises 
some doubts on the efficacy of investing resources in order to raise the level of general 
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knowledge on basic tenets of financial literacy from only a demand side perspective. Better 
policies should aim at designing more focused packages that, besides concepts more related to 
specific financial products, include also notions on how market structure features can narrow 
down investors’ available choices in the place they live in and how to manage this risk. 
The SHIW data limitations with reference to the pension choices investigated in the 
Italian case, though the survey provides the best available dataset, suggest caution in drawing 
strong policy implications. We view as a key shortcoming that warrants future research, 
possibly supported by special questionnaires in SHIW, the lack of microdata on self-reported 
subscription rate associated with no contributions, in the year of reference or at all. Missing 
contributions by one fifth of enrollees in the private pensions system, a share that raises on 
COVIP data to one fourth for subscribers to personal pension plans and to almost one third for 
self-employed subscribers raise intriguing research questions on the roles of financial literacy 
and of adequate saving of workers who have to rely increasingly on their own investment to 
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The wording of the financial literacy questionnaire in the 2010 SHIW. 
1) Which type of mortgage allows you to determine the maximum amount and the number of instalments 
to pay in order to extinguish the debt?  a. variable interest rate mortgage; b. fixed interest rate mortgage; c. variable 
interest rate and constant instalment mortgage; d. don’t know; e. no answer. 
2) You have a no-costs deposit of  1,000 euro offering a  1 per cent interest rate.  Assume a 3 per cent 
inflation rate. Do you think that, when withdrawing your deposit one year later, you will be able to buy the same 
amount of goods that costs 1,000 euro today? a. yes; b. no, a minor amount; c. a greater amount; d. don’t know; 
e. no answer.  
3) Which investment strategy is riskier: a. invest in one company; b. invest in many companies; c. don’t 





Table 1.        Subscriptions1 and subscribers2 (in italics, years 2016 and 2017) to the Private Pension System (end-year data)3 
 
 2007 2010 2015 2016 2017 
Occupational Pension Funds (FPNs)  1,988,639 2,010,904 2,419,103 2,597,022 2,560,686  
 
2,804,633 2,761,623  
Open Pension Funds (FPAs)  747,264 848,415 1,150,132 1,258,979 1,229,970  
 
1,374,205 1,343,159  
 
“New” PIPs  486,017 1,160,187 2,600,790 2,869,477 2,759,135  
 
3,104,209 2,969,187  
 
“Pre-existing” Pension Funds 

















Grand Total4 4,560,091 5,271,884 7,234,858 7,787,488 7,146,968  
 
8,298,969 7,585,969  
 
Source: COVIP (2018). 1 Data on subscriptions may include double counting referred to members enrolled in more than one pension fund. 
2Data on subscribers enrolled in only one pension fund. 3Data including also subscriptions with no contributions in the reference year. 
4FONDINPS is included. Excluded duplications for enrollees to old and new PIPs.  
Table 2.                Pension funds and sub-funds by investment – Compound net annual return rates (end-year percentages) 
 2009-2014 
       5 years 
2007-2017 
10 years 
Occupational Funds (FPNs) 4.8 3.3 
Guaranteed 3.0 2.6 
Bonds 1.5 1.2 
Mixed bonds  5.1 3.8 
Balanced 5.4 3.6 
All shares 7.3 3.7 
Open Funds (FPAs)         5.2 3.0 
Guaranteed 2.7 2.2 
Bonds 3.2 2.7 
Mixed bonds  4.5 3.0 
Balanced 5.8 3.5 
All shares 7.2 3.4 
“New” PIPs  
    Traditional Life Policies (Ramo I) 
 
3.2 2.8 
    Unit linked (Ramo III)    4.9 2.2 
  Bonds 1.9 1.6 
  Balanced 3.7 2.4 
  All shares  6.2 2.3 
Memorandum items: 
TFR revaluation rate 2.4 2.1 




Table. 3        Pension Funds. Synthetic Cost Indicator (SCI) by investment sub-funds (end-2017 data, per cent).  
Investment sub-funds  SCI 
2 years 5 years 10 years 35 years 
Guaranteed 
FPNs 1.1 0.6 0.5 0.3 
FPAs 2.3 1.4 1.2 1.1 
PIPs 3.7 2.4 1.9 1.4 
Bonds 
FPNs 1.1 0.6 0.4 0.2 
FPAs 1.9 1.3 1.1 0.9 
PIPs 3.5 2.4 1.9 1.6 
Balanced 
FPNs 1.0 0.5 0.4 0.2 
FPAs 2.4 1.6 1.4 1.3 
PIPs 3.6 2.6 2.2 1.9 
All shares 
FPNs 1.2 0.6 0.4 0.2 
FPAs 2.8 1.9 1.7 1.6 
PIPs 4.5 3.2 2.7 2.3 
FPNs 1,0 0.6 0.4 0.3 
  min 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.1 
  max 3.0 1.4 0.9 0.6 
FPAs 2,3 1.6 1.3 1.2 
  min 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.1 
  max 5.1 3.4 2.8 2.4 
PIPs 3,9 2.7 2.2 1.8 
  min 1.0 0.9 0.6 0.4 
  max 6.5 4.9 4.1 3.5 
Source: COVIP (2018). SCIs computed as simple averages for each sub-fund.  
 
Table 4.   Private pension plans1 subscription rate in balanced (BP) and unbalanced (UP) panels (%)  
 








Any private pension plans 23.7  23.2  23.7  
FPNs 3.0  3.6  2.3  
Matching compulsory and voluntary employers’ contribution (all plans) 9.8  8.8  9.7  
FPAs 2.2  3.0  2.9  
PIPs 12.8  11.8  11.0  
Source: own computation from SHIW (various years). SHIW statistics adjusted for sample weights. 1SHIW data do not allow to distinguish 









 Subscribers to 
Any private 
pension plans 
PIPs PIPNCsa PIPCs1 FPAs 
None 10.1 7.7 4.2 1.0 3.2 0.05 
One 17.7 14.1 6.5 3.2 3.3 1.3 
   Mortgage 64.6 15.6 8.1 4.6 3.5 1.8 
   Interest rate and inflation 75.6 17.5 8.7 4.7 4.0 2.0 
  Risk diversification 58.9 18.7 9.6 5.5 4.1 2.2 
Two 35.2 15.8 7.5 4.3 3.2 1.8 
  Mortgage and interest rate 53.6 16.6 8.5 4.7 3.8 2.0 
  Mortgage and  risk diversification 41.6 18.0 9.7 5.5 4.2 2.0 
  Risk diversification and interest rate 51.0 19.3 10.0 5.5 4.5 2.3 
At least two  68.9 17.6 8.8 4.9 3.9 2.1 
Three 37.0 18.6 10.0 5.5 4.5 2.2 




Table 6. Risky assets owners’ by a) financial literacy levels and b) private pension plans subscribed (%)  
 
Correct financial literacy answers 
None 0 
One: Risk diversification 15.5 
Two: Risk diversification & interest rate and inflation 17.1 
At least two  14.0 
Three 16.7 
Subscription rates to: 
Any private pension plans1 28.4 
- PIPs 13.0 
    PIPNCs 8.2 
    PIPCs 4.8 
- FPAs 5.7 
Source: see Table 5. 1 The grand total differs from the sum of sub-items.  
 
Table 7. Positive savings by financial literacy levels (%) 
 
 Correct answers Wrong answers 
One: Risk diversification 41.5 27.4 
Two: Risk diversification & interest rate and inflation 41.3 30.0 
At least two  38.5 29.6 
Three 40.3 33.0 
Source: see Table 5. 
 
Table 8.   Subscription rates to private pension plans by savings (%) 
 
 BP  UP 
 Savings No savings Savings No savings 
Any private pension plans1 26.6 14.4 25.3 13.4 
- PIPs 15.4 6.5 14.0 6.0 
    PIPNCs 8.8 3.4 7.4 2.9 
    PIPCs 6.6 3.1 6.6 3.1 
- FPAs 3.6 1.5 3.5 1.3 
Source: own computation from SHIW (various years); averaged (across 2010-2012-2014 waves) sample weighted data. 1 The grand total 





Table 9. Subscription rate to any private pension fund (PENS). Cross section LPM estimates (full samples)1 
 2010 2012 2014 
equivalent income deciles  
2nd     
 
3rd         
 
4th       
 
5th         
 
6th       
    
7th        
 
8th         
 
9th         
 
10th      
 
demographic characteristics 
age        
 




upper secondary  
 
university degree  
 
single     
 
widow(er)      
 
private employee    
 
public employee    
 
small firm (5- 49 workers)    
 
medium firm (50-99 workers)    
 
big firm (100+ workers)     
 
resident in the North         
 
resident in the Centre         
 
housing wealth 





positive saving  
 
risky asset owner 
 
sellers’ local availability  
medium city  
(20,000 to 40,000 inhabitants)   
large city 
(40,000 to 500,000 inhabitants)   
big city (500,000+) 


































































































































































































































F(30, 4779)  =  15.75*** 
 
Exclusion restrictions tests: 
T1: saving=risky assets=0 
T2: medium=large=big city=0 
T3: T1&T2 
 
F(2, 5316) = 11.86*** 
F(3, 5316) =  5.05** 
F(5, 5316) =  7.81*** 
 
F(2,  5127) = 7.41*** 
F(3,  5127) =  2.27+ 
F( 5,  5127) =  4.35*** 
 
F(2,  4779) = 9.44*** 
F(3,  4779) =  7.29*** 
F(5,  4779) = 8.74*** 
 
Source: own elaboration from  SHIW (2010, 2012, 2014). t-statistics out of robust SEs within brackets; +p< 0.10, *p< 0.05, ** p< 0.01, *** 
p< 0.001. 1 25 to 65 years old employed household heads. Reference categories: first decile of equivalent per household income, male, up to 
lower secondary degree, married, self-employed, micro firm (1-4 workers), residence in a small city (up to 20,000 inhabitants) and in the 





Table 10. Subscription rate to  PIPs. Cross section LPM estimates (full samples)1 
 2010 2012 2014 
equivalent income deciles  
2nd     
 
3rd         
 
4th       
 
5th         
 
6th       
    
7th        
 
8th         
 
9th         
 
10th      
 
demographic characteristics 
age        
 




upper secondary  
 
university degree  
 
single     
 
widow(er)      
 
private employee    
 
public employee    
 
small firm  (5- 49 workers)    
 
medium firm (50-99 workers)    
 
big firm  (100+ workers)     
 
resident in the North         
 
resident in the Centre         
 
housing wealth 





positive saving  
 
risky assets owner 
 
sellers’ local availability   
medium city (20,000 to 40,000)    
 
large city (40,000 to 500,000) 
 




















































































































































































































F(30, 5316) = 7.45*** 
5,158 
0.0517 
F(30, 5127) =  9.32*** 
4,810 
0.0512 
F(30, 4779) = 7.52*** 
Exclusion restrictions tests: 
T1: saving=risky assets=0 
T2: medium=large =big city=0 
T3: T1&T2 
 
F(2,  5316) = 8.95*** 
F(3,  5316) =    3.28** 
F( 5,  5316) = 5.95*** 
 
F( 2, 5127) = 1.75 
F( 3,  5127) =  3.30* 
F(5,  5127) =  2.63* 
 
F( 2, 4779) = 7.89*** 
F( 3, 4779) = 7.19*** 
F( 5, 4779) = 7.90*** 





Table 11.                                 Subscription rates to PIPCs and PIPNCs. Cross section LPM estimates (full samples)1 
 2010 2012 2014 
 PIPCs PIPNCs PIPCs PIPNCs PIPCs PIPNCs 
eqv. income deciles  
2nd     
 
3rd         
 
4th       
 
5th         
 
6th       
    
7th        
 
8th         
 
9th         
 
10th      
 
demographic chars 
age        
 








single     
 
widow(er)      
 
private employee    
 
public employee    
 
small firm (5- 49 
workers)    
medium firm (50-99 
workers)    
big firm (100+ workers)     
 
resident in the North         
 
resident in the Centre         
 
housing wealth 





positive saving  
 
risky assets owner 
 
sellers’ local avail.    
medium city (20,000 to 
40,000)    
large city (40,000 to 
500,000) 


























































































































































































































































































































































































































F(30, 5316) = 4.52*** 
5,347 
0.0338 
F(30, 5316) = 5.02*** 
5,158 
0.0608 
F(30, 5127) = 6.74*** 
5,158 
0.0262 
F(30, 5127) = 4.28*** 
4,810 
0.0530 
F(30, 4779) = 5.70*** 
4,810 
0.0244 










F(2,  5316) = 1.29 
 
F( 3, 5316) = 2.74* 
 
F(5,  5316) = 2.17* 
       
 
F(2,5316) = 8.37*** 
 
F(  3,  5316) =  0.87 
 
F( 5,  5316) = 4.18*** 
 
 
F(2, 5127) = 0.40 
 
F( 3,  5127) =  0.59 
 
F( 5, 5127) = 0.46 
 
 
F(2, 5127) = 2.63+ 
 
F(3, 5127) = 4.69* 
 
F(5, 5127) = 3.62* 
 
 
F(2, 4779) = 4.21* 
 
F(3,4779) = 4.37*** 
 
F( 5,  4779) = 4.38*** 
 
 
F( 2, 4779) = 4.44* 
 
F(3, 4779) = 3.06* 
 
F(5, 4779) =3.75*** 





Table 12. Subscription rates to FPAs. Cross section LPM estimates (full samples)1 
 
 2010 2012 2014 
equivalent income deciles  
2nd     
 
3rd         
 
4th       
 
5th         
 
6th       
    
7th        
 
8th         
 
9th         
 
10th      
 
demographic characteristics 
age        
 




upper secondary  
 
university degree  
 
single     
 
widow(er)      
 
private employee    
 
public employee    
 
small firm  (5- 49 workers)    
 
medium firm (50-99 workers)    
 
big firm  (100+ workers)     
 
resident in the North         
 
resident in the Centre         
 
housing wealth 





positive saving  
 
risky assets owner 
 
sellers’ local availability   
medium city (20,000 to 40,000)    
 
large city (40,000 to 500,000) 
 





















































































































































































































F(30, 5316)  =  3.31*** 
5,158 
0.0286 
F(30, 5127) =  3.72*** 
4,810 
0.0227 
F(30, 4779)  = 3.51*** 
Exclusion restrictions tests: 
T1: saving=risky assets=0 
T2: medium=large=big city=0 
T3: T1&T2 
 
F(2, 5316) = 4.20*** 
F(3,  5316) =  0.60 
F(5,  5316) =    2.14+ 
 
F(2,  5127) =    2.09 
F(3,  5127) =    2.07 
F(5,  5127) =    2.06* 
 
F(2,  4779) =  4.23* 
F(3,  4779) =    0.21 
F(5,  4779) =    1.75  




Table 13.  Average marginal effects (probit estimates at age = 45); only statistically significant effects1 
















 2010 (Obs = 5347) 
PENS -0.06*** 0.02* 0.07*** -0.05*** -0.03* -0.07*** 
PIPs -0.02*** 0.04**  -0.03* -0.03*** -0.04** 
- PIPCs  0.01+  -0.02+ -0.02** -0.02* 
- PIPNCs -0.02* 0.03***    -0.02+ 
FPA -0.01** - 0.02** 0.01 - - 
 2012 (Obs = 5158) 
PENS -0.05***  0.07*** -0.04*   
PIPs -0.02***   -0.03*** -0.02 -0.04*** 
- PIPCs -0.02*      
- PIPNCs   0.02+ -0.03** -0.02** -0.04** 
FPAs -0.01+  0.01+ -  -0.02* 
 2014 (Obs = 4810) 
PENS -0.06*** 0.03* 0.06***  -0.06*** -0.09*** 
PIPs -0.03*** 0.03* 0.04*** -0.03+ -0.05*** -0.07*** 
- PIPCs -0.03*** 0.02**  -0.02+ -0.03** -0.04** 
- PIPNCs   0.03**  -0.03** -0.02+ 
FPAs -0.01* 0.01*  - - - 





Table 14. Subscription rate to any private pension fund (PENS) and financial literacy. Cross section LPM estimates (samples out of 
balanced panel)1 
 2010 2012 2014 
equivalent income deciles  
2nd     
 
3rd         
 
4th       
 
5th         
 
6th       
    
7th        
 
8th         
 
9th         
 
10th      
 
demographic characteristics 
age        
 




upper secondary  
 
university degree  
 
single     
 
widow(er)      
 
private employee    
 
public employee    
 
small firm  (5- 49 workers)    
 
medium firm (50-99 workers)    
 
big firm  (100+ workers)     
 
Resident in the North         
 
Resident in the Centre         
 
housing wealth 





positive saving  
 
risky assets owner 
 
sellers’ local availability   
medium city (20,000 to 40,000)    
 
large city (40,000 to 500,000) 
 






























































































































































































































































































































































































F(31, 1628) = 7.51*** 
1,653 
0.1402 
F(31, 1621) = 8.37*** 
1,653 
0.1410                                                
 F(32, 1620) = 8.18*** 
1,621 
0.1312 
F(31, 1589) =  8.91*** 
1,621 
0.1318                                                 
F(32, 1588) =  8.64*** 
Exclusion restrictions tests: 
T1: saving=risky assets=0 
T2: medium=large=big city=0 
T3: T1&T2 
 
F(2, 1628) =  2.25+ 
F(3, 1628) = 6.42*** 
F( 5,  1628) = 4.74*** 
 
F(2, 1621) =  2.36+ 
F(3,  1621) = 3.62* 
F(5, 1621) = 3.06** 
  
F(2,  1589) = 1.25 
F(3,  1589) = 2.55+ 
F(5,  1589) = 2.03+ 
 
Source: own elaboration from  SHIW (2010, 2012, 2014). t-statistics out of robust SEs within brackets; +p< 0.10, *p< 0.05, ** p< 0.01, *** p< 0.001.  
125 to 65 years old employed household heads. Reference categories: first decile of equivalent per household income, male, up to lower secondary degree, married, self-employed, micro 
firm (1-4 workers), residence in a small city (up to 20,000 inhabitants) and in the South and Inlands, no home ownership, no mortgage, no saving, no risky assets ownership, less than three 
correct answers by household heads in the 2010 wave of the balanced panel.The table includes additional estimates for waves with statistically significant interactions of finlit_3 with city 




Table 15. Subscription rate to PIPs. Cross section LPM estimates (samples out of balanced panel)1 
 2010 2012 2014 
equivalent income deciles  
2nd     
 
3rd         
 
4th       
 
5th         
 
6th       
    
7th        
 
8th         
 
9th         
 
10th      
 
demographic characteristics 
age        
 




upper secondary  
 
university degree  
 
single     
 
widow(er)      
 
private employee    
 
public employee    
 
small firm  (5- 49 workers)    
 
medium firm (50-99 workers)    
 
big firm  (100+ workers)     
 
Resident in the North         
 
Resident in the Centre         
 
housing wealth 





positive saving  
 
risky asset owner 
 
sellers’ local availability   
medium city (20,000 to 40,000)    
 
large city (40,000 to 500,000) 
 




























































































































































0.0168    
(0.90)    
0.0419+   
(1.82)    
0.0220    
(0.99)    
0.0822**  
(2.72)    
0.0284    
(1.08)    
0.108**  
(3.28)    
0.0603+   
(1.89)    
0.0953**  
(2.65)    
0.103**  
(2.72)    
 
0.0188*   
(2.17)    
-0.000202*   
(-2.20)    
-0.0454**  
 -2.96)    
0.0328+   
(1.92)    
0.0468+   
(1.82)    
0.0296    
(0.97)    
0.00540    
(0.21)    
0.0180    
(0.70)    
-0.0284    
 (-1.29)    
-0.0162    
(-0.70)    
0.0523    
(1.10)    
0.0930**  
(2.92)    
0.0385*   
(2.03)    
-0.0277    
(-1.39)    
 
0.00727    
(0.36)    
-0.00413    
 (-0.20)    
 
0.0218    
(1.10)    
0.0302    
(1.03)    
 
-0.0291    
 (-0.97)    
-0.0431+   
 (-1.70)    
-0.0583    
(-1.35)    
0.0219    
(0.71)    
 
-0.402*   
 (-1.99)    
 
-0.0937*   
(-2.22)    
-0.0237    
 (-0.63)    
-0.0455    













































































F(31, 1628)  = 3.70*** 
1,653 
0.0782 
F(31, 1621) = 5.05*** 
1,653 
0.0810 
F(34, 1618) = 4.59 
1,621 
0.0810 
F(31, 1589) = 4.33*** 
Exclusion restrictions tests: 
T1: saving=risky assets=0 
T2: medium=large =big city=0 
T3: T1&T2 
 
F( 2,  1628) =    1.82 
F(3,  1628) = 6.51*** 
F( 5, 1628) =  4.48*** 
 
F(  2,  1621) =    1.32 
F(  3, 1621) =    4.51* 
F(  5,  1621) =    3.13* 
  
F(  2,  1589) =    2.20 
F(3,  1589) =    4.44** 
F( 5, 1589) =    3.55** 




Table 16.               Subscription rates to PIPCs and PIPNCs. Cross section LPM estimates (samples out of balanced panel)1 
 2010 2012 2014 
 PIPCs PIPNCs PIPCs PIPNCs PIPCs PIPNCs 
eqv. income deciles  
2nd     
 
3rd         
 
4th       
 
5th         
 
6th       
    
7th        
 
8th         
 
9th         
 
10th      
 
demographic chrs 
age        
 








single     
 
widow(er)      
 
private employee    
 
public employee    
 
small firm  (5- 49)  
 
medium firm (50-99)  
 
big firm  (100+)  
 
Resident in the North         
 
Resident in the 
Centre         
 
housing wealth 





positive saving  
 
risky asset owner 
 
sellers’ local avail.   
medium city (20,000 
to 40,000)    
large city (40,000 to 
500,000) 



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































F(31, 628) =  
2.51*** 
1,660 





F(31, 1628)  




=   2.47*** 
1,653 
0.0801                                                
F(34, 1618)       
=  2.28*** 
1,653 
0.0528 
F(31, 1621)    
=   2.60*** 
1,621 
0.1008 




F(34, 1586)    
=  2.56*** 
1,621 
0.0370 
F(31, 1589) =     
2.36*** 









F(3,  1628) = 
1.50 
F(5, 1628) = 
1.16 
  
F(2, 1628) =  
3.38* 
F(3, 1628) = 
4.82* 
F(5, 628) = 
4.36*** 
 
F(2, 1621) = 
0.47 
F(3, 1621) = 
0.74 
F(5, 1621) =    
0.62 
  
F(2, 1621) =    
2.18 
 F(3, 1621) =    
5.15* 
F(5, 1621) =    
3.66* 
 
F(2, 1589) =    
1.02 
F(3, 1589) =    
3.29* 
F(5, 1589) =    
2.33* 
  
F(2,  1589) =    
1.04 
F(3,  1589) =    
1.13 
F(5,  1589) =    
1.10 
1See Table 14.  +p< 0.10, *p< 0.05, ** p< 0.01, *** p< 0.001. 
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Table 17. Subscription rates to FPAs. Cross section LPM estimates (samples out of balanced panel)1 
 2010 2012 2014 


























upper secondary  
 










small firm  (5- 49 workers)  
 
medium firm (50-99 workers)  
 
big firm  (100+ workers)  
 
Resident in the North 
 










risky asset owner 
 
sellers’ local availability   
medium city (20,000 to 40,000) 
 
large city (40,000 to 500,000) 
 
































































































































































































































F(31, 1628)  =  1.23 
1,653 
0.0370 
F(31, 1621) =  1.55* 
1,621 
0.0376 
F(31, 1589) = 1.52* 
Exclusion restrictions tests: 
T1: saving=risky assets=0 
T2: medium=large=big city=0 
T3: T1&T2 
 
F(2, 1628) =  1.32 
F( 3, 1628) = 6.42*** 
F( 5,  1628) = 4.39*** 
 
F(  2,  1621) =    0.67 
F(  3,  1621) =    0.51 
F(  5,  1621) =    0.55 
 
F(2,  1589) = 0.73 
F(3,  1589) = 0.64 
F(5,  1589) =  0.63 




Table 18.  Average marginal effects for cross sections out of balanced panel (probit estimates at age= 45; baseline specifications with 
finlit_3 indicator interacted with city size; only statistically significant effects1 

















 2010 (Obs = 1660)  
PENS  -0.08***   -0.12*** -0.08*** -0.10*  
PIPs -0.05*** 0.03+  -0.09*** -0.07***   
- PIPCs -0.02+   -0.02+   -0.02+ 
- PIPNCs -0.04*** 0.03**  -0.06*** -0.05**   
FPAs 
(1445) 
-0.02**       
 2012 (Obs = 1653)  
PENS  -0.07**  0.06+ -0.10** -0.06* -0.07+  
PIPs -0.05**   -0.08*** -0.06** -0.09**  
- PIPCs -0.03*     -0.03+ -0.02+ 
- PIPNCs -0.3* 0.03*  -0.07*** -0.06*** -0.06*  
FPAs 
(1518) 
-0.02*       
 2014 (Obs = 1621)  
PENS  -0.08***   -0.06+ -0.08** -0.12**  
PIPs -0.03+   -0.06* -0.09*** -0.09** -0.03+ 
- PIPCs -0.03**   -0.03+ -0.05** -0.06** -0.04*** 
- PIPNCs     -0.03+   
FPAs 
(1513) 
-0.02*       
1See Tables 14 and A.3, and Appendix for wording.  Within brackets in the first column no of observations used for FPAs probit estimates. 
+p< 0.10, *p< 0.05, ** p< 0.01, *** p< 0.001.    
 
Table 19. Average marginal (differential) effects of alternative financial literacy indicators interacted with city size. Only 
statistically significant estimates in cross sections out of balanced panel (probit estimates at age= 45); wave in brackets1 








(1) & (3) (2) & (3) (1) & (2) At least two   (1) & (2) & (3) 
finlit_3   
 
PIPs    -0.03
+ (2014)    -0.03+ (2014) 
 
- PIPCs -0.03** (2010) 
-0.03* (2014) 
 





- 0.02+ (2010) 
-0.03* (2014) 
 
- -0.02+ (2010) 
-0.02+ (2012) 
-0.04*** (2014)  
- PIPNCs 0.02
+ (2012) 0.03** (2014)     0.02+ (2012) 
0.03+ (2014) 
0.02+ (2012)  
FPAs  -0.04* (2010)  0.01
+ (2010) 
-0.02+ (2012) 
 -0.03** (2012)  -0.03+ (2012)  
1See Tables 14 and A.3, and Appendix for wording. LPM estimates (with no interactions) in bold italics when the probit estimates are not 


































Occupational Funds (FPNs) -6.3 8.5 3.0 0.1 8.2 5.4 7.3 2.7 2.7 2.6 
Guaranteed 3.1 4.6 0.2 -0.5 7.7 3.1 4.6 1.9 0.8 0.8 
Bonds 1.6 2.9 0.4 1.7 3.0 1.2 1.2 0.5 0.2 -0.2 
Mixed bonds  -3.9 8.1 3.6 1.1 8.1 5.0 8.1 2.7 3.2 2.6 
Balanced -9.4 10.4 3.6 -0.6 9.2 6.6 8.5 3.2 3.2 3.1 
All shares -24.5 16.1 6.2 -3.0 11.4 12.8 9.8 5.0 4.4 5.9 






















Bonds 4.9 4.0 1.0 1.0 6.4 0.8 6.9 0.9 1.3 -0.3 
Mixed bonds  -2.2 6.7 2.6 0.4 8.0 3.6 8.0 2.2 1.4 0.4 
Balanced -14.2 12.6 4.7 -2.3 10.0 8.3 8.7 3.7 2.7 3.7 
All shares -27.6 17.7 7.2 -5.3 10.8 16.0 8.7 4.2 3.2 7.2 
“New” PIPs  





















  Unit linked (Ramo III) -21.9 14.5 4.7 -5.2 7.9 10.9 6.8 3.2 3.6 2.2 
  Bonds 2.4 3.7 0.6 0.8 4.9 -0.3 3.3 0.6 0.4 -0.7 
  Balanced -8.3 7.8 2.5 -3.5 6.4 5.8 8.2 1.9 1.5 2.3 
  All shares -32.4 20.6 6.7 -7.9 9.6 17.2 7.1 4.5 6.0 3.2 
Memorandum items:           
TFR revaluation rate 2.7 2.0 2.6 3.5 2.9 1.7 1.3 1.2 1.5 1.7 
 
Source: COVIP (2018). Return rates are net of management fees and of the substitute tax.  
 
 
Table A.2         Descriptive statistics (averages): employed household heads estimation full sample (% of observations, except for 
age) 
 
 2010  obs  =   5,347 2012  obs =   5,158 2014   obs =  4,810 
PENS 0.2040396 0.1927104 0.1848233 
PIPs 0.0978119 0.0878247 0. 0858628 
- PIPCs 0.0426407 0.0453664 0.0467775 
- PIPNCs 0.0551711 0.0424583 0.0390852 
FPAs 0.0246867 0.0224893 0.0237006 
Explanatory variables 











age     
female       
upper secondary  
university degree  
single              
widow(er) 
private employee       
public employee       
small firm  (5- 49)  
medium firm (50-99)  
big firm  (100+)  
resident in the North             
resident in the Centre                      
housing wealth 
home owner  
mortgagee  
financial strength 
saving > 0   
risky asset owner 
sellers’ local availability   
medium city (20,000 to 40,000) 
large city (40,000 to 500,000)       







































































































Source: own computation from SHIW.   
41 
 
Table A.3  Descriptive statistics (averages): employed household heads estimation BP sample (% of observations except for age) 
    
 2010  (obs = 1660) 2012  (obs = 1653) 2014  (obs = 1621) 
PENS 0.2174699 0.2171809 0.2220851 
PIPs 0.1072289 0.102843 0.102406 
- PIPCs 0.0493976 0.047792 0.053671 
- PIPNCs 0.0578313 0.055051 0.048735 
FPAs 0.0222892 0.029038 0.029611 
Financial literacy level indicators: correct answers to 2010 SHIW three questions 
Three      0.4481928 0.4440411 0.4361505 
At least two 0.7716867 0.7701149 0.770512 
Risk diversification & interest rate and    
inflation  
0.5903614 0.5898367 0.5848242 
Risk diversification  & mortgage 0.4783133 0.4742892 0.4663788 
Mortgage & interest rate  and  inflation  0.6198795 0.61464 0.6125848 
Risk  diversification    0.6445783 0.6448881 0.6403455 
Interest rate  and inflation  0.8319277 0.8294011 0.8297347 
Mortgage 0.696988 0.6908651 0.6890808 
Explanatory variables 











age     
female       
upper secondary  
university degree  
single              
widow(er) 
private employee       
public employee       
small firm  (5- 49)  
medium firm (50-99)  
big firm  (100+)  
Resident in the North             
Resident in the Centre                      
housing wealth 
home owner  
mortgagee  
financial strength 
saving > 0   
risky asset owner 
sellers’ local availability   
medium city (20,000 to 40,000) 
large city (40,000 to 500,000)       







































































































Source: own computation from SHIW.  
 
CEFIN – Centro Studi di Banca e Finanza www.cefin.unimore.it 
Dipartimento di Economia Marco Biagi – Università di Modena e Reggio Emilia 
Viale Jacopo Berengario 51, 41121 MODENA (Italy)   
tel. 39-059.2056711 (Centralino)  fax 39-059 205 6927 
 
CEFIN Working Papers ISSN (online) 2282-8168 
 
 
71 Spending Policies of Italian Banking Foundations, by Pattarin, F. (July, 2018).  
70 The Forecasting Performance of Dynamic Factors Models with Vintage Data, by Di Bonaventura, L., 
Forni, M. and Pattarin, F. (July 2018).  
69 Housing Market Shocks in Italy: a GVAR Approach, by Cipollini, A. and Parla, F. (April, 2018).  
68 Customer Complaining and Probability of Default in Consumer Credit, by Cosma, S., 
Pancotto, F. and  Vezzani, P. (March, 2018).  
67 Is Equity Crowdfunding a Good Tool for Social Enterprises?, by Cosma, S., Grasso, A.G.,  
Pagliacci, F. and Pedrazzoli, A. (February, 2018).  
66 Household Preferences for Socially Responsible Investments, 
by Rossi. M.C., Sansone, D., Torricelli, C. and van Soest, A. (February2018).  
65 Market-Book Ratios of European Banks: What does Explain the Structural Fall?,  
by Ferretti, R.,Gallo, G., Landi, A. and Venturelli. V. (January 2018).  
64 Past Income Scarcity and Current Perception of Financial Fragility, by Baldini, 
M., Gallo, G. and Torricelli, C. (December 2017).  
63 How does Financial Market Evaluate Business Models? Evidence from European Banks, 
by Cosma, S., Ferretti, R.,Gualandri, E., Landi, A. and Venturelli, V. (May 2017)  
62 Individual Heterogeneity and Pension Choices.  How to Communicate an Effective Message?,  
by Gallo, G., Torricelli, C. and van Soest, A. (April 2017)  
61 The Risk-Asymmetry Index, by Elyasiani, E., Gambarelli L. and Muzzioli, S.(December 2016)  
60 Strumenti per il sostegno finanziario di famiglie e microimprese: il caso italiano (Policies to 
help financially vulnerable Italian households and micro-businesses),  
by Cotterli, S. (December 2016)  
59 A test of the Behavioral versus the Rational model of Persuasion in Financial Advertising, 
by Ferretti, R., Pancotto, F. and Rubaltelli, E. (May 2016)  
58 Financial connectedness among European volatility risk premia, 
by Cipollini, A., Lo Cascio, I. and Muzzioli, S. (December 2015)  
57 The effectiveness of insider trading regulations. The case of the Italian tender offers, 
by Ferretti, R., Pattitoni, P. and Salinas, A. (September 2015)  
56 Introducing Aggregate Return on Investment as a Solution for the Contradiction between 
some PME Metrics and IRR, by Altshuler D. and Magni, C.A. (September 2015)  
55 ‘It’s a trap!’ The degree of poverty persistence in Italy and Europe, by Giarda, E. and  
Moroni, G. (September 2015)  
54 Systemic risk measures and macroprudential stress tests. An assessment over the 2014 
EBA exercise. by Pederzoli, C. and Torricelli,C.  (July 2015)  
53 Emotional intelligence and risk taking in investment decision-making, by Rubaltelli, E., 
 
CEFIN – Centro Studi di Banca e Finanza www.cefin.unimore.it 
Dipartimento di Economia Marco Biagi – Università di Modena e Reggio Emilia 
Viale Jacopo Berengario 51, 41121 MODENA (Italy)   
tel. 39-059.2056711 (Centralino)  fax 39-059 205 6927 
 
Agnoli, S., Rancan, M.and Pozzoli, T. (July 2015)  
52 Second homes: households’ life dream or wrong investment?, by Brunetti, M. and 
Torricelli, C. (May  2015)  
51 Pseudo-naïve approaches to investment performance measurement, by Magni, C.A.  
(February, 2015)  
50 Monitoring systemic risk. A survey of the available macroprudential Toolkit, by  
Gualandri, E. and Noera, M. (November 2014).  
49 Towards a macroprudential policy in the EU: Main issues, by Gualandri, E. and 
 Noera, M. (November 2014).  
48 Does homeownership partly explain low participation in supplementary pension  
schemes?, by Santantonio, M., Torricelli, C., and Urzì Brancati M.C.,  (September 2014)  
47 An average-based accounting approach to capital asset investments: The case of project finance,  
by Magni, C.A. (September 2014) 
46 Should football coaches wear a suit? The impact of skill and management structure on Serie A  
Clubs’ performance, by Torricelli, C., Urzì Brancati M.C., and Mirtoleni, L. (July 2014) 
45 Family ties: occupational responses to cope with a household income shock, by Baldini, M., 
Torricelli, C., Urzì Brancati M.C. (April 2014) 
44 Volatility co-movements: a time scale decomposition analysis, by Cipollini, I., Lo Cascio I.,  
Muzzioli. S. (November 2013) 
43 The effect of revenue and geographic diversification on bank performance, by Brighi, P.,  
Venturelli, V. (October 2013)  
42 The sovereign debt crisis: the impact on the intermediation model of Italian banks,  
by Cosma,S., Gualandri, E. (October 2013)  
41 The financing of Italian firms and the credit crunch: findings and exit strategies,  
by Gualandri, E., Venturelli, V. (October 2013)  
40 Efficiency and unbiasedness of corn futures markets: New evidence across the financial crisis, 
by Pederzoli, C., Torricelli, C. (October 2013)  
39 La regolamentazione dello short selling: effetti sul mercato azionario italiano (Short selling ban:  
effects on the Italian stock market), by Mattioli L., Ferretti R. (August 2013) 
38 A liquidity risk index as a regulatory tool for systematically important banks? An empirical  
assessment across two financial crises, by Gianfelice G., Marotta G., Torricelli C. (July 2013) 
  
37 Per un accesso sostenibile delle Pmi al credito (A sustainable access to credit for SMEs),  
by Marotta, G. (May 2013) 
36 The unavoidable persistence of forum shopping in the Insolvency Regulation, by  
Mucciarelli, F.M. (April 2013) 
35 Rating Triggers, Market Risk and the Need for More Regulation, by Parmeggiani, F. 
(December 2012) 
 
CEFIN – Centro Studi di Banca e Finanza www.cefin.unimore.it 
Dipartimento di Economia Marco Biagi – Università di Modena e Reggio Emilia 
Viale Jacopo Berengario 51, 41121 MODENA (Italy)   
tel. 39-059.2056711 (Centralino)  fax 39-059 205 6927 
 
34 Collateral Requirements of SMEs: The Evidence from Less–Developed Countries,  
by Hanedar, E.H.  Broccardo, E. and Bazzana, F. (November 2012) 
33 Is it money or brains? The determinants of intra-family decision power, by Bertocchi, G.,  
Brunetti, M. and Torricelli, C. (June 2012) 
32 Is financial fragility a matter of illiquidity? An appraisal for Italian households, by Brunetti, M,  
Giarda, E. and Torricelli, C. (June 2012) 
31 Attitudes, personality factors and household debt decisions: A study of consumer credit,  
by Stefano Cosma and Francesco Pattarin (February 2012) 
30 Corridor implied volatility and the variance risk premium in the Italian market,  
by Silvia Muzzioli (November 2011) 
29 Internal Corporate Governance and the Financial Crisis: Lessons for Banks,  
Regulators and Supervisors, by Gualandri, E., Stanziale, A. and Mangone, E. (November 2011) 
28 Are  defined contribution pension schemes socially sustainable? A conceptual  
map from a macroprudential perspective, by Marotta, G. (October 2011) 
27 Basel 3, Pillar 2: the role of banks’ internal governance and control function, by  
Gualandri, E. (September 2011) 
26 Underpricing, wealth loss for pre-existing shareholders and the cost of going 
public: the role of private equity backing in Italian IPOs, by Ferretti, R.  and Meles, 
A. (April 2011) 
25 Modelling credit risk for innovative firms: the role of innovation measures, by 
Pederzoli C., Thoma G., Torricelli C. (March 2011) 
24 Market Reaction to Second-Hand News: Attention Grabbing or Information 
Dissemination?, by Cervellati E.M., Ferretti R., Pattitoni P. (January 2011) 
23 Towards a volatility index for the Italian stock market, by Muzzioli S. (September 
2010) 
22 A parsimonious default prediction model for Italian SMEs, by Pederzoli C., 
Torricelli C. (June 2010) 
21 Average Internal Rate of Return and investment decisions: a new perspective, by 
Magni C.A. (February 2010) 
20 The skew pattern of implied volatility in the DAX index options market, by Muzzioli 
S. (December 2009) 
19 Accounting and economic measures: An integrated theory of capital budgeting, by 
Magni C.A. (December 2009) 
18 Exclusions of US-holders in cross-border takeover bids and the principle of 
equality in tender offers, by Mucciarelli F. (May 2009).  
17 Models for household portfolios and life-cycle allocations in the presence of labour 
income and longevity risk, by Torricelli C. (March 2009)  
16 Differential evolution of combinatorial search for constrained index tracking, by 
Paterlini S, Krink T, Mittnik S. (March 2009)  
15 Optimization heuristics for determining internal rating grading scales, by Paterlini 
S, Lyraa M, Pahaa J, Winker P. (March 2009)  
 
CEFIN – Centro Studi di Banca e Finanza www.cefin.unimore.it 
Dipartimento di Economia Marco Biagi – Università di Modena e Reggio Emilia 
Viale Jacopo Berengario 51, 41121 MODENA (Italy)   
tel. 39-059.2056711 (Centralino)  fax 39-059 205 6927 
 
14 The impact of bank concentration on financial distress: the case of the European 
banking system, by Fiordelisi F, Cipollini A. (February 2009)  
13 Financial crisis and new dimensions of liquidity risk: rethinking prudential 
regulation and supervision, by Landi A, Gualandri E, Venturelli V. (January 2009)  
12 Lending interest rate pass-through in the euro area: a data-driven tale, by Marotta 
G. (October 2008)  
11 Option based forecast of volatility: an empirical study in the Dax index options 
market, Muzzioli S. (May 2008)  
10 Lending interest rate pass-through in the euro area, by Marotta G. (March 2008) 
9 Indebtedness, macroeconomic conditions and banks’ losses: evidence from Italy, 
by Torricelli C, Castellani S, Pederzoli C. (January 2008)  
8 Is public information really public? The role of newspapers, Ferretti R, Pattarin F. 
(January 2008)  
7 Differential evolution of multi-objective portfolio optimization, by Paterlini S, Krink 
T. (January 2008) 
6 Assessing and measuring the equity gap and the equity, by Gualandri E, 
Venturelli V. (January 2008)  
5 Model risk e tecniche per il controllo dei market parameter, Torricelli C, Bonollo M, 
Morandi D, Pederzoli C. (October 2007) 
4 The relations between implied and realised volatility, are call options more 
informative than put options? Evidence from the Dax index options market, by 
Muzzioli S. (October 2007) 
3 The maximum LG-likelihood method: an application to extreme quantile 
estimation in finance, by Ferrari D., Paterlini S. (June 2007)  
2 Default risk: Poisson mixture and the business cycle, by Pederzoli C. (June 2007)  
1 Population ageing, household portfolios and financial asset returns: a survey of 
the literature, by Brunetti M. (May 2007)  
 
